fix(ci): temporary clawhub publish workaround for MIT-0 consent (#117)

* fix(ci): patch clawhub publish payload for temporary MIT-0 consent workaround

* fix(ci): make clawhub publish patch self-contained for tag republish

* fix(clawsec-nanoclaw): harden signature verification boundaries

* chore(clawsec-nanoclaw): bump version to 0.0.3

* fix(clawsec-nanoclaw): normalize integrity policy and baseline paths

.github/workflows/skill-release.yml

@@ -17,6 +17,9 @@ on:
 
 permissions: read-all
 
+env:
+  CLAWHUB_CLI_VERSION: 0.7.0
+
 concurrency:
   group: skill-release-${{ github.ref }}
   cancel-in-progress: false
@@ -1006,7 +1009,51 @@ jobs:
 
       - name: Install clawhub CLI
         if: needs.release-tag.outputs.publishable == 'true' && env.CLAWHUB_TOKEN != ''
-        run: npm install -g clawhub@0.7.0
+        run: npm install -g clawhub@${CLAWHUB_CLI_VERSION}
+
+      - name: Patch clawhub publish payload workaround
+        # Temporary: clawhub@0.7.0 publish payload is missing acceptLicenseTerms.
+        if: needs.release-tag.outputs.publishable == 'true' && env.CLAWHUB_TOKEN != ''
+        run: |
+          node <<'NODE'
+          const { execSync } = require("node:child_process");
+          const fs = require("node:fs");
+          const path = require("node:path");
+
+          const npmRoot = execSync("npm root -g", { encoding: "utf8" }).trim();
+          const publishScriptPath = path.join(
+            npmRoot,
+            "clawhub",
+            "dist",
+            "cli",
+            "commands",
+            "publish.js"
+          );
+
+          if (!fs.existsSync(publishScriptPath)) {
+            throw new Error(`clawhub publish script not found: ${publishScriptPath}`);
+          }
+
+          const original = fs.readFileSync(publishScriptPath, "utf8");
+          if (original.includes("acceptLicenseTerms: true")) {
+            console.log(`[patch-clawhub] Already patched: ${publishScriptPath}`);
+            process.exit(0);
+          }
+
+          const payloadPattern = /changelog,\r?\n(\s*)tags,/;
+          if (!payloadPattern.test(original)) {
+            throw new Error(
+              `[patch-clawhub] Could not find expected publish payload pattern in ${publishScriptPath}`
+            );
+          }
+
+          const patched = original.replace(
+            payloadPattern,
+            (_, indent) => `changelog,\n${indent}acceptLicenseTerms: true,\n${indent}tags,`
+          );
+          fs.writeFileSync(publishScriptPath, patched, "utf8");
+          console.log(`[patch-clawhub] Patched: ${publishScriptPath}`);
+          NODE
 
       - name: Login to ClawHub
         if: needs.release-tag.outputs.publishable == 'true' && env.CLAWHUB_TOKEN != ''
@@ -1117,7 +1164,50 @@ jobs:
           node-version: 20
 
       - name: Install clawhub CLI
-        run: npm install -g clawhub@0.7.0
+        run: npm install -g clawhub@${CLAWHUB_CLI_VERSION}
+
+      - name: Patch clawhub publish payload workaround
+        # Temporary: clawhub@0.7.0 publish payload is missing acceptLicenseTerms.
+        run: |
+          node <<'NODE'
+          const { execSync } = require("node:child_process");
+          const fs = require("node:fs");
+          const path = require("node:path");
+
+          const npmRoot = execSync("npm root -g", { encoding: "utf8" }).trim();
+          const publishScriptPath = path.join(
+            npmRoot,
+            "clawhub",
+            "dist",
+            "cli",
+            "commands",
+            "publish.js"
+          );
+
+          if (!fs.existsSync(publishScriptPath)) {
+            throw new Error(`clawhub publish script not found: ${publishScriptPath}`);
+          }
+
+          const original = fs.readFileSync(publishScriptPath, "utf8");
+          if (original.includes("acceptLicenseTerms: true")) {
+            console.log(`[patch-clawhub] Already patched: ${publishScriptPath}`);
+            process.exit(0);
+          }
+
+          const payloadPattern = /changelog,\r?\n(\s*)tags,/;
+          if (!payloadPattern.test(original)) {
+            throw new Error(
+              `[patch-clawhub] Could not find expected publish payload pattern in ${publishScriptPath}`
+            );
+          }
+
+          const patched = original.replace(
+            payloadPattern,
+            (_, indent) => `changelog,\n${indent}acceptLicenseTerms: true,\n${indent}tags,`
+          );
+          fs.writeFileSync(publishScriptPath, patched, "utf8");
+          console.log(`[patch-clawhub] Patched: ${publishScriptPath}`);
+          NODE
 
       - name: Login to ClawHub
         run: |

skills/clawsec-nanoclaw/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -5,6 +5,20 @@ All notable changes to the ClawSec NanoClaw compatibility skill will be document
 The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.0.0/),
 and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html).
 
+## [0.0.3] - 2026-03-09
+
+### Security
+
+- Removed runtime public-key override from host-side package signature verification; verification now always uses the pinned ClawSec key.
+- Removed unsigned-package override path in host-side verification flow.
+- Added strict package/signature path policy for signature verification (`/tmp`, `/var/tmp`, `/workspace/ipc`, `/workspace/project/data`, `/workspace/project/tmp`, `/workspace/project/downloads`) with absolute-path, extension, symlink, and realpath boundary checks.
+- Added policy-bound path enforcement for integrity approvals: approvals now require normalized paths that are explicitly present in non-ignored integrity policy targets.
+
+### Changed
+
+- Updated MCP signature verification tool docs and behavior to align with bounded path policy and pinned-key-only verification.
+- Added regression tests for signature-verification and integrity-approval hardening invariants.
+
 ## [0.0.2] - 2026-02-28
 
 ### Added

skills/clawsec-nanoclaw/INSTALL.md

@@ -140,6 +140,8 @@ From within a NanoClaw agent session, the following tools should be available:
 
 **Signature Verification** (mcp-tools/signature-verification.ts):
 - `clawsec_verify_skill_package` - Verify Ed25519 signature on skill packages
+  - Uses pinned ClawSec public key (no runtime key override)
+  - Accepts staged package/signature paths only under `/tmp`, `/var/tmp`, `/workspace/ipc`, `/workspace/project/data`, `/workspace/project/tmp`, `/workspace/project/downloads`
 
 **Integrity Monitoring** (mcp-tools/integrity-tools.ts):
 - `clawsec_check_integrity` - Check protected files for unauthorized changes

skills/clawsec-nanoclaw/SKILL.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 ---
 name: clawsec-nanoclaw
-version: 0.0.2
+version: 0.0.3
 description: Use when checking for security vulnerabilities in NanoClaw skills, before installing new skills, or when asked about security advisories affecting the bot
 ---
 
@@ -186,6 +186,7 @@ if (advisory.exploitability_score === 'high' || advisory.severity === 'critical'
 **Update Frequency**: Every 6 hours (automatic)
 
 **Signature Verification**: Ed25519 signed feeds
+**Package Verification Policy**: pinned key only, bounded package/signature paths
 
 **Cache Location**: `/workspace/project/data/clawsec-advisory-cache.json`
 

skills/clawsec-nanoclaw/docs/SKILL_SIGNING.md

@@ -130,16 +130,21 @@ console.log('Safe to proceed with installation.');
 ### MCP Tool: `clawsec_verify_skill_package`
 
 **Parameters:**
-- `packagePath` (required): Absolute path to skill package (`.tar.gz` or `.zip`)
+- `packagePath` (required): Absolute path to skill package (`.tar.gz`, `.tar`, `.tgz`, or `.zip`)
 - `signaturePath` (optional): Path to signature file (auto-detects `.sig` if omitted)
 
+Path policy:
+- Files must be under one of: `/tmp`, `/var/tmp`, `/workspace/ipc`, `/workspace/project/data`, `/workspace/project/tmp`, `/workspace/project/downloads`
+- Symlinks are rejected
+- Signatures must use `.sig`
+
 **Returns:**
 ```typescript
 {
   success: boolean,           // Operation completed without errors
   valid: boolean,             // Signature is cryptographically valid
   recommendation: string,     // "install" | "block" | "review"
-  signer: string,             // "clawsec" or custom signer
+  signer: string,             // "clawsec"
   algorithm: "Ed25519",       // Signature algorithm
   verifiedAt: string,         // ISO timestamp
   packageInfo: {
@@ -335,22 +340,10 @@ openssl pkey -pubin -in feed-signing-public.pem -outform DER | \
 # Expected: <will be filled in after key generation>
 ```
 
-### Using Custom Public Keys
+### Public Key Policy
 
-For organizational deployments with custom skill publishers:
-
-```typescript
-// Load custom public key
-const customPublicKey = fs.readFileSync('/path/to/org-public.pem', 'utf8');
-
-// Verify with custom key (not pinned ClawSec key)
-const verification = await tools.clawsec_verify_skill_package({
-  packagePath: '/tmp/org-skill.tar.gz',
-  publicKeyPath: '/path/to/org-public.pem'  // Custom key
-});
-```
-
-**Note**: The MCP tool currently uses the pinned key. Custom key support via `publicKeyPem` parameter requires host-side implementation.
+The verifier always uses the pinned ClawSec public key from this skill package.
+Runtime public-key overrides are intentionally not supported.
 
 ### Key Rotation
 

skills/clawsec-nanoclaw/guardian/integrity-monitor.ts

@@ -312,7 +312,7 @@ export class IntegrityMonitor {
       if (target.path) {
         // Direct path
         targets.push({
-          path: target.path,
+          path: path.resolve(target.path),
           mode: target.mode,
           priority: target.priority
         });
@@ -336,6 +336,18 @@ export class IntegrityMonitor {
     return targets;
   }
 
+  private normalizeBaselines(manifest: BaselinesManifest): BaselinesManifest {
+    const normalizedFiles: Record<string, FileBaseline> = {};
+    for (const [filePath, baseline] of Object.entries(manifest.files || {})) {
+      normalizedFiles[path.resolve(filePath)] = baseline;
+    }
+
+    return {
+      ...manifest,
+      files: normalizedFiles,
+    };
+  }
+
   // --------------------------------------------------------------------------
   // Baseline Management
   // --------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -343,7 +355,7 @@ export class IntegrityMonitor {
   private loadBaselines(): BaselinesManifest {
     if (fs.existsSync(this.baselinesPath)) {
       const raw = fs.readFileSync(this.baselinesPath, 'utf-8');
-      return JSON.parse(raw);
+      return this.normalizeBaselines(JSON.parse(raw));
     }
 
     return {
@@ -585,37 +597,43 @@ export class IntegrityMonitor {
       throw new Error('Baselines not loaded');
     }
 
-    if (!fs.existsSync(filePath)) {
-      throw new Error(`File not found: ${filePath}`);
+    const normalizedFilePath = path.resolve(filePath);
+
+    if (!fs.existsSync(normalizedFilePath)) {
+      throw new Error(`File not found: ${normalizedFilePath}`);
     }
 
-    refuseSymlink(filePath);
+    refuseSymlink(normalizedFilePath);
 
-    const previousSha = this.baselines.files[filePath]?.sha256;
-    const currentSha = sha256File(filePath);
+    const targets = this.resolveTargets();
+    const target = targets.find(t => t.path === normalizedFilePath);
+    if (!target || target.mode === 'ignore') {
+      throw new Error(`File ${normalizedFilePath} not in policy`);
+    }
+
+    const previousSha = this.baselines.files[normalizedFilePath]?.sha256;
+    const currentSha = sha256File(normalizedFilePath);
 
     // Generate diff
-    const snapshot = path.join(this.approvedDir, path.basename(filePath));
+    const snapshot = path.join(this.approvedDir, path.basename(normalizedFilePath));
     const oldText = fs.existsSync(snapshot) ? fs.readFileSync(snapshot, 'utf-8') : '';
-    const newText = fs.readFileSync(filePath, 'utf-8');
-    const diff = unifiedDiff(oldText, newText, `approved/${path.basename(filePath)}`, path.basename(filePath));
+    const newText = fs.readFileSync(normalizedFilePath, 'utf-8');
+    const diff = unifiedDiff(
+      oldText,
+      newText,
+      `approved/${path.basename(normalizedFilePath)}`,
+      path.basename(normalizedFilePath)
+    );
 
     const patchPath = path.join(
       this.patchesDir,
-      `${new Date().toISOString().replace(/[:.]/g, '-')}-approve-${safePatchTag(path.basename(filePath))}.patch`
+      `${new Date().toISOString().replace(/[:.]/g, '-')}-approve-${safePatchTag(path.basename(normalizedFilePath))}.patch`
     );
     fs.writeFileSync(patchPath, diff);
 
     // Update baseline
-    if (!this.baselines.files[filePath]) {
-      // Find mode from policy
-      const targets = this.resolveTargets();
-      const target = targets.find(t => t.path === filePath);
-      if (!target) {
-        throw new Error(`File ${filePath} not in policy`);
-      }
-
-      this.baselines.files[filePath] = {
+    if (!this.baselines.files[normalizedFilePath]) {
+      this.baselines.files[normalizedFilePath] = {
         sha256: currentSha,
         approved_at: utcNowIso(),
         approved_by: actor,
@@ -623,13 +641,13 @@ export class IntegrityMonitor {
         priority: target.priority
       };
     } else {
-      this.baselines.files[filePath].sha256 = currentSha;
-      this.baselines.files[filePath].approved_at = utcNowIso();
-      this.baselines.files[filePath].approved_by = actor;
+      this.baselines.files[normalizedFilePath].sha256 = currentSha;
+      this.baselines.files[normalizedFilePath].approved_at = utcNowIso();
+      this.baselines.files[normalizedFilePath].approved_by = actor;
     }
 
     // Update snapshot
-    fs.copyFileSync(filePath, snapshot);
+    fs.copyFileSync(normalizedFilePath, snapshot);
 
     // Save and audit
     this.saveBaselines();
@@ -639,7 +657,7 @@ export class IntegrityMonitor {
       event: 'approve',
       actor,
       note,
-      path: filePath,
+      path: normalizedFilePath,
       expected_sha: previousSha,
       found_sha: currentSha,
       patch_path: patchPath
@@ -656,8 +674,9 @@ export class IntegrityMonitor {
       throw new Error('Baselines not loaded');
     }
 
-    const files = filePath
-      ? { [filePath]: this.baselines.files[filePath] }
+    const normalizedFilePath = filePath ? path.resolve(filePath) : null;
+    const files = normalizedFilePath
+      ? { [normalizedFilePath]: this.baselines.files[normalizedFilePath] }
       : this.baselines.files;
 
     return {

skills/clawsec-nanoclaw/host-services/ipc-handlers.ts

@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ export async function handleAdvisoryIpc(
 
     case 'verify_skill_signature': {
       // Skill signature verification (Phase 1)
-      const { requestId, packagePath, signaturePath, publicKeyPem, allowUnsigned } = task;
+      const { requestId, packagePath, signaturePath } = task;
 
       logger.info({ sourceGroup, requestId, packagePath }, 'Verifying skill signature');
 
@@ -73,8 +73,6 @@ export async function handleAdvisoryIpc(
         const result = await deps.signatureVerifier.verify({
           packagePath,
           signaturePath,
-          publicKeyPem,
-          allowUnsigned: allowUnsigned || false,
         });
 
         await writeResponse(requestId, {

skills/clawsec-nanoclaw/host-services/skill-signature-handler.ts

@@ -40,8 +40,81 @@ export interface VerificationResult {
 export interface VerifyParams {
   packagePath: string;
   signaturePath: string;
-  publicKeyPem?: string;      // Optional override of pinned key
-  allowUnsigned?: boolean;    // Allow missing signature (default: false)
+}
+
+const ALLOWED_PACKAGE_ROOTS = [
+  '/tmp',
+  '/var/tmp',
+  '/workspace/ipc',
+  '/workspace/project/data',
+  '/workspace/project/tmp',
+  '/workspace/project/downloads',
+] as const;
+
+const ALLOWED_PACKAGE_EXTENSIONS = ['.zip', '.tar', '.tgz', '.tar.gz'] as const;
+
+function isWithinAllowedRoots(filePath: string): boolean {
+  return ALLOWED_PACKAGE_ROOTS.some((root) => filePath === root || filePath.startsWith(`${root}/`));
+}
+
+function hasAllowedPackageExtension(filePath: string): boolean {
+  return ALLOWED_PACKAGE_EXTENSIONS.some((ext) => filePath.endsWith(ext));
+}
+
+function normalizeAndValidatePath(rawPath: string, kind: 'package' | 'signature'): string {
+  if (!path.isAbsolute(rawPath)) {
+    throw new SecurityPolicyError(`${kind} path must be absolute`);
+  }
+
+  const resolved = path.resolve(rawPath);
+  if (!isWithinAllowedRoots(resolved)) {
+    throw new SecurityPolicyError(
+      `${kind} path must be under allowed roots: ${ALLOWED_PACKAGE_ROOTS.join(', ')}`
+    );
+  }
+
+  if (kind === 'package' && !hasAllowedPackageExtension(resolved)) {
+    throw new SecurityPolicyError(
+      `package path must use one of: ${ALLOWED_PACKAGE_EXTENSIONS.join(', ')}`
+    );
+  }
+
+  if (kind === 'signature' && !resolved.endsWith('.sig')) {
+    throw new SecurityPolicyError('signature path must end with .sig');
+  }
+
+  return resolved;
+}
+
+function ensureExistingRegularFile(filePath: string, kind: 'package' | 'signature'): string {
+  if (!fs.existsSync(filePath)) {
+    throw new SecurityPolicyError(`${kind} file not found: ${filePath}`);
+  }
+
+  const stat = fs.lstatSync(filePath);
+  if (stat.isSymbolicLink()) {
+    throw new SecurityPolicyError(`${kind} path cannot be a symlink`);
+  }
+  if (!stat.isFile()) {
+    throw new SecurityPolicyError(`${kind} path must be a regular file`);
+  }
+
+  const realPath = fs.realpathSync(filePath);
+  if (!isWithinAllowedRoots(realPath)) {
+    throw new SecurityPolicyError(`${kind} real path escapes allowed roots`);
+  }
+
+  return realPath;
+}
+
+function validatePackagePath(rawPackagePath: string): string {
+  const resolved = normalizeAndValidatePath(rawPackagePath, 'package');
+  return ensureExistingRegularFile(resolved, 'package');
+}
+
+function validateSignaturePath(rawSignaturePath: string): string {
+  const resolved = normalizeAndValidatePath(rawSignaturePath, 'signature');
+  return ensureExistingRegularFile(resolved, 'signature');
 }
 
 /**
@@ -68,70 +141,40 @@ export class SkillSignatureVerifier {
     const {
       packagePath,
       signaturePath,
-      publicKeyPem,
-      allowUnsigned = false
     } = params;
 
-    // Validate package file exists
-    if (!fs.existsSync(packagePath)) {
+    let validatedPackagePath: string;
+    let validatedSignaturePath: string;
+    try {
+      validatedPackagePath = validatePackagePath(packagePath);
+      validatedSignaturePath = validateSignaturePath(signaturePath);
+    } catch (error) {
       return {
         valid: false,
         signer: null,
         packageHash: '',
         verifiedAt: new Date().toISOString(),
         algorithm: 'Ed25519',
-        error: `Package file not found: ${packagePath}`
+        error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error),
       };
     }
 
-    // Check signature file exists
-    if (!fs.existsSync(signaturePath)) {
-      if (allowUnsigned) {
-        // Unsigned allowed - compute hash but mark invalid
-        const packageHash = sha256File(packagePath);
-        return {
-          valid: false,
-          signer: null,
-          packageHash,
-          verifiedAt: new Date().toISOString(),
-          algorithm: 'Ed25519',
-          error: 'No signature file found (unsigned package)'
-        };
-      } else {
-        // Unsigned not allowed - fail
+    // Load pinned ClawSec key only
+    let keyPem: string;
+    try {
+      if (!fs.existsSync(this.publicKeyPath)) {
         return {
           valid: false,
           signer: null,
           packageHash: '',
           verifiedAt: new Date().toISOString(),
           algorithm: 'Ed25519',
-          error: `Signature file not found: ${signaturePath}`
+          error: `Public key file not found: ${this.publicKeyPath}`
         };
       }
-    }
 
-    // Load public key (either custom or pinned)
-    let keyPem: string;
-    try {
-      if (publicKeyPem) {
-        // Custom key provided - validate format
-        loadPublicKey(publicKeyPem); // Throws if invalid
-        keyPem = publicKeyPem;
-      } else {
-        // Load pinned ClawSec key
-        if (!fs.existsSync(this.publicKeyPath)) {
-          return {
-            valid: false,
-            signer: null,
-            packageHash: '',
-            verifiedAt: new Date().toISOString(),
-            algorithm: 'Ed25519',
-            error: `Public key file not found: ${this.publicKeyPath}`
-          };
-        }
-        keyPem = fs.readFileSync(this.publicKeyPath, 'utf8');
-        loadPublicKey(keyPem); // Validate pinned key
-      }
+      keyPem = fs.readFileSync(this.publicKeyPath, 'utf8');
+      loadPublicKey(keyPem); // Validate pinned key
     } catch (error) {
       if (error instanceof SecurityPolicyError) {
         return {
@@ -156,7 +199,7 @@ export class SkillSignatureVerifier {
     // Compute package hash (always, for integrity tracking)
     let packageHash: string;
     try {
-      packageHash = sha256File(packagePath);
+      packageHash = sha256File(validatedPackagePath);
     } catch (error) {
       return {
         valid: false,
@@ -170,8 +213,8 @@ export class SkillSignatureVerifier {
 
     // Verify signature
     const verificationResult = verifyDetachedSignatureWithDetails(
-      packagePath,
-      signaturePath,
+      validatedPackagePath,
+      validatedSignaturePath,
       keyPem
     );
 

skills/clawsec-nanoclaw/lib/types.ts

@@ -224,8 +224,6 @@ export interface VerifySkillSignatureRequest {
   timestamp: string;
   packagePath: string;
   signaturePath: string;
-  publicKeyPem?: string;      // Optional: override default public key
-  allowUnsigned?: boolean;    // Optional: allow missing signature (default: false)
 }
 
 /**

skills/clawsec-nanoclaw/mcp-tools/signature-verification.ts

@@ -18,6 +18,55 @@ declare function writeIpcFile(dir: string, data: any): void;
 declare const TASKS_DIR: string;
 declare const groupFolder: string;
 
+const ALLOWED_VERIFICATION_ROOTS = [
+  '/tmp',
+  '/var/tmp',
+  '/workspace/ipc',
+  '/workspace/project/data',
+  '/workspace/project/tmp',
+  '/workspace/project/downloads',
+] as const;
+
+const ALLOWED_PACKAGE_EXTENSIONS = ['.zip', '.tar', '.tgz', '.tar.gz'] as const;
+
+function isWithinAllowedRoots(filePath: string): boolean {
+  return ALLOWED_VERIFICATION_ROOTS.some((root) => filePath === root || filePath.startsWith(`${root}/`));
+}
+
+function validatePackagePath(rawPath: string): string {
+  if (!path.isAbsolute(rawPath)) {
+    throw new Error('packagePath must be absolute');
+  }
+
+  const resolved = path.resolve(rawPath);
+  if (!isWithinAllowedRoots(resolved)) {
+    throw new Error(`packagePath must be under: ${ALLOWED_VERIFICATION_ROOTS.join(', ')}`);
+  }
+
+  if (!ALLOWED_PACKAGE_EXTENSIONS.some((ext) => resolved.endsWith(ext))) {
+    throw new Error(`packagePath must end with one of: ${ALLOWED_PACKAGE_EXTENSIONS.join(', ')}`);
+  }
+
+  return resolved;
+}
+
+function validateSignaturePath(rawPath: string): string {
+  if (!path.isAbsolute(rawPath)) {
+    throw new Error('signaturePath must be absolute');
+  }
+
+  const resolved = path.resolve(rawPath);
+  if (!isWithinAllowedRoots(resolved)) {
+    throw new Error(`signaturePath must be under: ${ALLOWED_VERIFICATION_ROOTS.join(', ')}`);
+  }
+
+  if (!resolved.endsWith('.sig')) {
+    throw new Error('signaturePath must end with .sig');
+  }
+
+  return resolved;
+}
+
 // Result waiting helper
 async function waitForResult(requestId: string, timeoutMs: number = 5000): Promise<any> {
   const resultDir = '/workspace/ipc/clawsec_results';
@@ -49,10 +98,13 @@ server.tool(
   },
   async (args: { packagePath: string; signaturePath?: string }) => {
     const requestId = `verify-signature-${Date.now()}-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8)}`;
-    const sigPath = args.signaturePath || `${args.packagePath}.sig`;
+    let packagePath: string;
+    let sigPath: string;
 
-    // Validate package file exists
-    if (!fs.existsSync(args.packagePath)) {
+    try {
+      packagePath = validatePackagePath(args.packagePath);
+      sigPath = validateSignaturePath(args.signaturePath || `${packagePath}.sig`);
+    } catch (error) {
       return {
         content: [{
           type: 'text' as const,
@@ -60,7 +112,23 @@ server.tool(
             success: false,
             valid: false,
             recommendation: 'block',
-            error: `Package file not found: ${args.packagePath}`
+            error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error),
+          }, null, 2)
+        }],
+        isError: true
+      };
+    }
+
+    // Validate package file exists
+    if (!fs.existsSync(packagePath)) {
+      return {
+        content: [{
+          type: 'text' as const,
+          text: JSON.stringify({
+            success: false,
+            valid: false,
+            recommendation: 'block',
+            error: `Package file not found: ${packagePath}`
           }, null, 2)
         }],
         isError: true
@@ -73,7 +141,7 @@ server.tool(
       requestId,
       groupFolder,
       timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),
-      packagePath: args.packagePath,
+      packagePath,
       signaturePath: sigPath,
     });
 
@@ -90,7 +158,7 @@ server.tool(
               success: false,
               valid: false,
               recommendation: 'block',
-              packagePath: args.packagePath,
+              packagePath,
               signaturePath: sigPath,
               error: result.message || 'Verification failed',
               reason: result.error?.code || 'UNKNOWN_ERROR'
@@ -109,7 +177,7 @@ server.tool(
               success: true,
               valid: false,
               recommendation: 'block',
-              packagePath: args.packagePath,
+              packagePath,
               signaturePath: sigPath,
               reason: result.data?.error || 'Signature verification failed',
               packageInfo: {
@@ -128,13 +196,13 @@ server.tool(
             success: true,
             valid: true,
             recommendation: 'install',
-            packagePath: args.packagePath,
+            packagePath,
             signaturePath: sigPath,
             signer: result.data.signer,
             algorithm: result.data.algorithm,
             verifiedAt: result.data.verifiedAt,
             packageInfo: {
-              size: fs.statSync(args.packagePath).size,
+              size: fs.statSync(packagePath).size,
               sha256: result.data.packageHash
             }
           }, null, 2)

skills/clawsec-nanoclaw/skill.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "clawsec-nanoclaw",
-  "version": "0.0.2",
+  "version": "0.0.3",
   "description": "ClawSec security suite for NanoClaw - Advisory feed monitoring, MCP tools for vulnerability checking, and Ed25519 signature verification for containerized WhatsApp bot agents",
   "author": "prompt-security",
   "license": "AGPL-3.0-or-later",

skills/clawsec-nanoclaw/test/security-hardening.test.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
+import fs from 'node:fs';
+import path from 'node:path';
+import test from 'node:test';
+import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
+
+const __filename = fileURLToPath(import.meta.url);
+const __dirname = path.dirname(__filename);
+const SKILL_ROOT = path.resolve(__dirname, '..');
+
+function readSkillFile(relativePath) {
+  return fs.readFileSync(path.join(SKILL_ROOT, relativePath), 'utf8');
+}
+
+test('signature verifier enforces pinned key and path policy', () => {
+  const source = readSkillFile('host-services/skill-signature-handler.ts');
+
+  assert.ok(!source.includes('publicKeyPem?: string'), 'publicKeyPem override must be removed');
+  assert.ok(!source.includes('allowUnsigned?: boolean'), 'allowUnsigned override must be removed');
+
+  assert.ok(source.includes('const ALLOWED_PACKAGE_ROOTS'), 'must define allowed package roots');
+  assert.ok(source.includes('validatePackagePath('), 'must validate package path before hashing');
+  assert.ok(source.includes('validateSignaturePath('), 'must validate signature path before verification');
+});
+
+test('IPC advisory handler does not forward key or unsigned overrides', () => {
+  const source = readSkillFile('host-services/ipc-handlers.ts');
+
+  assert.ok(!source.includes('publicKeyPem'), 'IPC handler must not accept publicKeyPem override');
+  assert.ok(!source.includes('allowUnsigned'), 'IPC handler must not accept allowUnsigned override');
+});
+
+test('MCP signature tool validates filesystem boundaries', () => {
+  const source = readSkillFile('mcp-tools/signature-verification.ts');
+
+  assert.ok(source.includes('const ALLOWED_VERIFICATION_ROOTS'), 'must define allowed verification roots');
+  assert.ok(source.includes('validatePackagePath('), 'must validate package path in MCP layer');
+  assert.ok(source.includes('validateSignaturePath('), 'must validate signature path in MCP layer');
+});
+
+test('integrity approvals are restricted to policy targets', () => {
+  const source = readSkillFile('guardian/integrity-monitor.ts');
+
+  assert.ok(source.includes('const normalizedFilePath = path.resolve(filePath);'), 'must normalize approved path');
+  assert.ok(
+    source.includes("if (!target || target.mode === 'ignore')"),
+    'must require approved file to exist in non-ignored policy target list'
+  );
+});
+
+test('integrity targets and baselines use normalized absolute paths', () => {
+  const source = readSkillFile('guardian/integrity-monitor.ts');
+
+  assert.ok(source.includes('path: path.resolve(target.path)'), 'resolveTargets must normalize direct target paths');
+  assert.ok(source.includes('const normalizedFilePath = path.resolve(filePath);'), 'status/approval lookups must normalize file paths');
+  assert.ok(source.includes('normalizedFiles[path.resolve(filePath)] = baseline;'), 'loaded baselines must be normalized to absolute keys');
+});