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davida-ps
369745821f
* feat(traffic-guardian): add runtime monitoring skill baselines * fix(traffic-guardian): align changelog and i18n fallback docs * chore(traffic-guardian): prepare beta1 release metadata
94 lines
2.4 KiB
Markdown
94 lines
2.4 KiB
Markdown
# NanoClaw Traffic Guardian Specification
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## Goal
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Provide NanoClaw with opt-in runtime traffic monitoring that observes host-managed NanoClaw traffic for exfiltration and injection signals while preserving container isolation.
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## Required Architecture
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Implement four layers:
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1. Detector core
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- normalized finding schema
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- pattern registry
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- snippet redaction
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- deduplication
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- JSONL report writer
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2. Host service
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- proxy lifecycle
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- CA key ownership
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- log storage
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- config validation
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- IPC task handling
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3. MCP tool surface
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- `clawsec_traffic_status`
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- `clawsec_traffic_findings`
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- `clawsec_traffic_check_config`
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4. Operator interface
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- safe setup text
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- explicit host/container proxy wiring guidance
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- CA fingerprint display when HTTPS inspection is enabled
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## Finding Schema
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Findings must be JSON objects with these fields:
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```json
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{
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"schema_version": "clawsec-traffic-finding/v1",
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"platform": "nanoclaw",
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"direction": "outbound",
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"protocol": "http",
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"threat_type": "EXFIL",
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"pattern": "ai_api_key",
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"severity": "high",
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"source": "127.0.0.1",
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"dest": "api.example.com:443",
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"snippet": "[REDACTED]",
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"timestamp": "2026-04-26T00:00:00.000Z"
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}
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```
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## Minimum Detection Set
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Outbound EXFIL:
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- AI API keys
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- AWS access key IDs
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- private key PEM markers
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- SSH key file paths
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- sensitive Unix file paths
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- dotenv and cloud credential paths
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- WhatsApp session or credential path markers when NanoClaw exposes stable names
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Inbound INJECTION:
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- pipe-to-shell commands
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- shell exec flags
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- reverse shell command shapes
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- destructive remove commands
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- SSH authorized-key injection shapes
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## Safety Requirements
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- Default mode is detect-and-log.
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- Blocking mode must not exist in the first implementation.
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- Snippets must be redacted before persistence and before MCP responses.
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- Maximum scan bytes must be configurable and bounded.
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- CA private key material must stay host-side.
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- System trust-store instructions must require explicit operator confirmation and must never run automatically.
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## Tests Required Before Release
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- detector unit tests for each pattern
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- redaction tests proving secrets are not persisted or returned through MCP
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- host-service lifecycle tests
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- IPC timeout and malformed-task tests
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- MCP schema tests
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- proxy fixture tests for HTTP request and response inspection
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- no-false-positive tests for common benign traffic
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